



UNC
KENAN-FLAGLER
BUSINESS SCHOOL



ARMY STRATEGIC LEADER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM – INTERMEDIATE COURSE

Instructor: Professor Atul Nerkar

Date: Tuesday, January 27, 2015
1300 - 1730

Topic: Strategic Plan Diagnosis & Execution

Objectives:

- Understand differences between strategy formulation and implementation
- Understand the difference between different types of strategies – what is planned versus what happens versus what emerges?
- Develop the ability to formulate and implement strategies in a ‘turnaround’ situation
- Be able to work in teams while implementing strategy

Required Readings:

1. Sentra Software: An Impossible Mission (Darden Case: UVA-OM-0922)
2. Kaplan, Robert S., Norton, David P. The Balanced Scorecard - Measures That Drive Performance, Harvard Business Review. (R0507Q-PDF-ENG)

Recommended Readings (available at UNC):

3. Hambrick, Donald C. and Frederickson, James W. 2001. Are you sure you have a strategy? Academy of Management Executive, 15(4): 48-60
4. Porter, M. E. 1996. What is Strategy? Harvard Business Review. 74(6): 61-79

Suggestions for Preparation:

You will be the Management Team (not just CEO) that has taken over a troubled company Sentra Software, a data mining software company. Your objective is to turn around the company and take it to profitability. You will have 16 quarters (four years) to make decisions. If you are ‘fired’ by Steve Tucker, the CEO of Gigasoft the parent company of Sentra, you will have to start again!

SENTRA SOFTWARE: AN IMPOSSIBLE MISSION?

Mission Impossible?

Like Jim Phelps on a classic *Mission Impossible* episode, Steve Tucker, the CEO of Gigasoft, had an impossible mission to fulfill: getting his company's poorly performing subsidiary, Sentra Software, out of the hole and back up and functioning as a profitable, growing company again.

Referring to Tucker's objectives as impossible seemed to be a fair assessment for many analysts. Several years earlier, Sentra had become the market leader by including powerful high-tech features in its software and capturing the lead over its largest competitor, Data Digger. Sentra's position at the top had remained unchanged, but Data Digger's software had been gaining notoriety, while Sentra's sales had been stagnant and below target projections. Many reviewers had derided Sentra's latest software release, calling it "adequate, but not overwhelming." Tucker claimed this assessment was "a far cry from the days when Sentra's technical features defined the state-of-the-art in data-mining software."

The Balanced-Score-Card Summit Meeting

When Tucker's conglomerate, Gigasoft, had acquired Sentra two years earlier, he sought to restore Sentra to the throne of undisputed leader. Sentra's last (and recently fired) president, Wayne Handy, had been charged with meeting this goal. Handy tried to expand Sentra's data-mining-software appeal by targeting the generalist market, which included those businesses with data-analysis needs that called for easy-to-use, multipurpose software. Handy referred to the customers in this new market as "general managers," in a market area being explored at the time by ExecuData, a new player in data mining. He hired new Sentra Software professionals to serve as field consultants to assist potential general-manager-oriented customers and Sentra's Information Technology department software engineers to develop new features and uses for the software within various administrative and professional skills-based areas of a firm.

This case was prepared by Matthew Davisson, Research Assistant, and Robert D. Landel, the Henry E. McWane Professor of Business Administration and based on the simulation "Balancing the Corporate Scorecard." It was written as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Copyright © 2000 by the University of Virginia Darden School Foundation, Charlottesville, VA. All rights reserved. *To order copies, send an e-mail to sales@ardenbusinesspublishing.com. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of the Darden School Foundation. Rev. 6/07. ◊*

Although Sentra had traditionally been the figurehead at the power end of the data-mining market, Handy attempted to bridge the gap between the power and ease-of-use features. He allocated approximately 30% of IT-development resources toward development of this latest version of software targeted at the new market.

Handy also called Sentra department heads to a summit meeting to consider a balanced-score-card approach for improving the company's performance. After a rocky beginning, the group finally aligned itself with two critical business processes: Customer Acquisition and Customer Retention. Acquisition was achieved by generating ideas (especially power features) that appealed to the customer demographics. Retention was accomplished by customer service that met requests from software users. A scorecard consultant suggested using a three-step approach.

By following a three-step approach, the group would determine a set of metrics that would enable Sentra executives to think through their business strategy and formulate various measures of business performance. In following the balanced-score-card approach, executives kept in mind four perspectives and addressed four questions:

- How do we look to shareholders? (Financial Metrics)
- How do customers see us? (Customer Metrics)
- Where must we excel to meet our goals? (Internal Business Processes Metrics)
- How do we continue to improve and create value? (Learning and Growth Metrics)

The summit group presented its findings in the form of a balanced-scorecard-metric spectrum (see **Exhibit 1**). For metric definitions and the most recent quarter's performance statistics see **Exhibit 2**.

Recent Performance

Despite Handy's best efforts, he was unable to boost Sentra's performance. The general-managers marketing campaigns fell through, demonstrating that the primary customer market comprised technically skilled users (i.e., analysts, IT professionals, and engineers) who were not interested in ease-of-use software. Further hampering his efforts was the shakedown in the Customer Service Department, as most of the more experienced and skilled customer-service representatives had left when Gigasoft bought Sentra. This had seriously undermined the department's ability to handle customers' service requests and did further damage to Sentra's reputation and sales. The company's profits not only failed to climb, but also fell lower. Having come up well short of Tucker's demands, Handy quickly found himself out of a job.

Turnaround Goals and Strategies

With Handy gone, Tucker had set some seemingly impossible goals for his company. He wanted the new president of Sentra Software to double revenues over the next four years in order to bring Sentra back into the black by the end of three quarters and to reach an overall profit margin of 15% within two years. These objectives appeared to be even further over the horizon when Sentra's performance in the last quarter was considered: the company's total revenue barely reached \$1.76 million, while its expenses totaled \$2.05 million, leaving the company in the red by \$290,000, or a loss on revenue of 16.5% (see **Exhibit 1**).

Challenges

As the new president of Sentra Software, Steve Tucker had challenged employees with the mission of getting Sentra back on its feet by restoring the strength of the company's Customer Service Department and developing new software designed to bring the company's focus back to its traditional "techie" market. Tucker's objectives included the following:

1. Breaking even in three quarters
2. Showing a 15% profit margin in two years
3. Doubling revenue over four years

Tucker also had a clear plan for how Sentra needed to go about meeting these performance objectives. Following the step-by-step thinking of the balanced-score-card approach, Tucker had devised his strategy.

1. Increase the focus on power features and improved customer service to acquire and maintain Sentra's techie customers.
2. Develop a more attractive product for the techie market through world-class customer service and strong power appeal to position Sentra to take on a larger share.
3. Boost revenue and profitability after cornering this share.

The plan was a challenging one, and many said an impossible one, given Sentra's past weakness and the strength of the competition. But Tucker was determined. He also had a reputation as a heavy hitter, but employees wondered whether following his strategy would be enough to turn Sentra around and protect their jobs.

Exhibit 1

SENTRA SOFTWARE: AN IMPOSSIBLE MISSION?
Balanced-Scorecard-Metric Possibilities for Sentra Software

Metric	Definition	Last Quarter
Financial		\$ in millions
Annual Revenues	Annualized revenue from software sales and from delivering consulting services, in millions of dollars	\$6.75
Quarterly Revenue		\$1.69
Sentra Consulting Revenue	% revenue derived from delivery of consulting services to the General-Management-market customers	\$0.09
Software Revenue		\$1.60
Software % Revenue	% revenue derived from software sales	94.5%
Revenue Growth %	Increase (or decrease) in revenue as a percentage of last-quarter revenue	0.0%
Revenue Gap %	Deviation from the annualized revenue target set by Steve Tucker, expressed as a percentage	(-3.6%)
Annual Expenses	Annualized expenditures on employee salaries, information technology, cost of goods sold, etc., in millions of dollars	\$8.06
Quarterly Expenses		\$2.01
COG Sold		\$0.13
IT Expense		\$0.22
Payroll Total		\$1.03
Sales		\$0.40
Training		\$0.09
Fixed		\$0.15
Annual Profit	Annualized revenue less annualized expense in millions of dollars	(\$1.31)
Profit Margin %	Annualized Profit as a percentage of annualized revenue	(19.4%)
Profit Gap %	Actual profit margin minus the target profit margin set by Steve Tucker	(2.5%)
Cash	Sentra's liquid assets in millions of dollars. Sentra goes out of business if this quantity reaches zero at any time.	\$1.00

Exhibit 1 (continued)

Metric	Definition	Last Quarter by Market	
		Techie	GM
Customer		Techie	GM
Sales Growth %	Measures the industry-wide quarter-to-quarter percentage change in total sales	0.0%	0.0%
Total Unit Sales	Total industry unit sales	2793	496
Sentra Sales	Number of units sold	1592	4
Market Share	Percentage of customers that purchased software from Sentra relative to total units sold	57.0%	0.7%
Sentra % Sales Growth	Increase (decrease) in Sentra's unit sales as a percentage of last-quarter unit sales	0%	0%
Customer Satisfaction	On a scale of 0-100, measurement of satisfaction of Sentra's customers (by type) with Sentra's product and delivery (100 is best; 50 is average).	50	4
Product Appeal	Appeal of Sentra's software product to potential customers, relative to the appeal of competitors' products, expressed as a percentage; 100% means that Sentra's product is just as appealing as the products offered by competitors.	129%	1%
Service Appeal	Appeal of Sentra's service delivery to potential customers, relative to the appeal of competitors' service delivery, expressed as a percentage; 100% means that Sentra's service is just as appealing as the services offered by competitors.	123%	7%

Exhibit 1 (continued)

Metric	Definition	Last Quarter
Internal Business Processes		
Average Development Cycle Time	Average time (in quarters) it takes to develop a new version of the software	5.0
Customer-Service Lead Time	Average amount of time, in days, that would be required for Sentra customer-service representatives to work off the current backlog of Techie requests. Less than 10 days is considered good, and above 20 is considered bad.	0.8
Customer-Service Backlog	Number of requests for Techie customer service waiting to be filled	26
Consulting Lead Time	Average amount of time, in days, that would be required for Sentra Consultant representatives to work off the current backlog of consulting requests. Less than 12 days is considered good, and above 24 is considered bad.	1.5
Consulting Backlog	Number of requests for Consultants' services that are waiting to be filled	2.9
Power-Feature Index	How power features stack up against competitors' offerings in terms of power features; 100 is equal parity and lower numbers indicate less powerful.	150.0
Relative Ease of Use	How ease-of-use features stack up against competitors' (GM market products); 100 is equal parity, and lower numbers indicate less powerful.	37.1
Release Readiness	Index of how close Sentra is to releasing the next version of its software product. When the index is 100%, the product is released.	0%
Ease-of-Use Features in Development Index	This index ranges from 0 to 125, and provides an indicator of the number and quality of the Ease-of-Use Features currently implemented in the version in development. Numbers in the 100 range indicate substantial Ease-of-Use functionality.	0

Exhibit 1 (continued)

Metric	Definition	Last Quarter
Learning and Growth		
Consulting Revenue per consultant	Annualized revenue derived from Sentra Consultants' Services divided by the number of Sentra consultants, in thousands of dollars per person	\$31
Revenue per person	Annualized total revenue per employee, in thousands of dollars	\$47
Average skill per Customer-Service rep	Measured on scale of 0 to 100, with 100 being best, and 50 being average	47
Average skill per Consultant	Measured on scale of 0 to 100, with 100 being best, and 50 being average	50
Customer-Service-productivity index	Index of productivity: 70 is average	64
Consultant-productivity index	Index of productivity: 70 is average	60
IT in Pipeline/employee	Dollar value, in thousands, of information-technology infrastructure per employee that has been purchased but is not operational	\$10
IT On-Line/employee	Dollar value, in thousands, of IT infrastructure per employee that is operational	\$40
Average Quality Power Ideas	Ideas Index representing Quality of Power features in the software version that Sentra is currently developing, where 100 is maximum achievable	70
Average Quality Ease-of-Use Ideas	Ideas Index representing Quality of Ease-of-Use features in the software version that Sentra is currently developing, where 100 is maximum Ease-of-Use Quality	33

Exhibit 2

SENTRA SOFTWARE: AN IMPOSSIBLE MISSION?

Sentra Financial Summary for Last Quarter

Revenue (in millions of dollars)	1.67
Consulting Revenue	0.09
Total Revenue	1.76
Expenses	
Fixed	0.15
Variable	
Sales	0.42
Salary	1.03
Cost of Goods Sold	0.14
Training and Information Technology	0.31
Total Variable	1.90
Total Expenses, Fixed and Variable	2.05
Profit (Loss)	(0.29)
Profit (Loss) Margin	(16.5%)

The balanced scorecard tracks all the important elements of a company's strategy—from continuous improvement and partnerships to teamwork and global scale. And that allows companies to excel.

BEST OF HBR 1992

The Balanced Scorecard

Measures That Drive Performance

by Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton

By the 1980s, many executives were convinced that traditional measures of financial performance didn't let them manage effectively and wanted to replace them with operational measures. Arguing that executives should track both financial and operational metrics, Robert Kaplan and David Norton suggested four sets of parameters.

First, how do customers see your company? Find out by measuring lead times, quality, performance and service, and costs. Second, what must your company excel at? Determine the processes and competencies that are most critical, and specify measures, such as cycle time, quality, employee skills, and productivity, to track them. Third, can your company continue to improve and create value? Monitor your ability to launch new products, create more value for customers, and improve operating efficiencies. Fourth, how has your company done by its shareholders? Measure cash flow, quarterly sales growth, operating income by division, and increased market share by segment and return on equity.

The balanced scorecard lets executives see whether they have improved in one area at the ex-

pense of another. Knowing that, say the authors, will protect companies from posting suboptimal performance.

What you measure is what you get. Senior executives understand that their organization's measurement system strongly affects the behavior of managers and employees. Executives also understand that traditional financial accounting measures like return on investment and earnings per share can give misleading signals for continuous improvement and innovation—activities today's competitive environment demands. The traditional financial performance measures worked well for the industrial era, but they are out of step with the skills and competencies companies are trying to master today.

As managers and academic researchers have tried to remedy the inadequacies of current performance measurement systems, some have focused on making financial measures more relevant. Others have said, "Forget the financial measures; improve operational measures like cycle time and defect rates. The fi-

nancial results will follow." But managers should not have to choose between financial and operational measures. In observing and working with many companies, we have found that senior executives do not rely on one set of measures to the exclusion of the other. They realize that no single measure can provide a clear performance target or focus attention on the critical areas of the business. Managers want a balanced presentation of both financial and operational measures.

During a yearlong research project with 12 companies at the leading edge of performance measurement, we devised a "balanced scorecard"—a set of measures that gives top managers a fast but comprehensive view of the business. The balanced scorecard includes financial measures that tell the results of actions already taken. And it complements the financial measures with operational measures on customer satisfaction, internal processes, and the organization's innovation and improvement activities—operational measures that are the drivers of future financial performance.

Think of the balanced scorecard as the dials and indicators in an airplane cockpit. For the complex task of navigating and flying a plane, pilots need detailed information about many aspects of the flight. They need information on fuel, airspeed, altitude, bearing, destination, and other indicators that summarize the current and predicted environment. Reliance on one instrument can be fatal. Similarly, the complexity of managing an organization today requires that managers be able to view performance in several areas at once.

The balanced scorecard allows managers to look at the business from four important perspectives. (See the exhibit "The Balanced Scorecard Links Performance Measures.") It provides answers to four basic questions:

- How do customers see us? (customer perspective)
- What must we excel at? (internal business perspective)
- Can we continue to improve and create value? (innovation and learning perspective)
- How do we look to shareholders? (financial perspective)

While giving senior managers information from four different perspectives, the balanced scorecard minimizes information overload by limiting the number of measures used. Companies rarely suffer from having too few mea-

asures. More commonly, they keep adding new measures whenever an employee or a consultant makes a worthwhile suggestion. One manager described the proliferation of new measures at his company as its "kill another tree program." The balanced scorecard forces managers to focus on the handful of measures that are most critical.

Several companies have already adopted the balanced scorecard. Their early experiences using the scorecard have demonstrated that it meets several managerial needs. First, the scorecard brings together, in a single management report, many of the seemingly disparate elements of a company's competitive agenda: becoming customer oriented, shortening response time, improving quality, emphasizing teamwork, reducing new product launch times, and managing for the long term.

Second, the scorecard guards against suboptimization. By forcing senior managers to consider all the important operational measures together, the balanced scorecard lets them see whether improvement in one area may have been achieved at the expense of another. Even the best objective can be achieved badly. Companies can reduce time to market, for example, in two very different ways: by improving the management of new product introductions or by releasing only products that are incrementally different from existing products. Spending on setups can be cut either by reducing setup times or by increasing batch sizes. Similarly, production output and first-pass yields can rise, but the increases may be due to a shift in the product mix to more standard, easy-to-produce but lower-margin products.

We will illustrate how companies can create their own balanced scorecard with the experiences of one semiconductor company—let's call it Electronic Circuits Incorporated. ECI saw the scorecard as a way to clarify, simplify, and then operationalize the vision at the top of the organization. The ECI scorecard was designed to focus the attention of its top executives on a short list of critical indicators of current and future performance.

Customer Perspective: How Do Customers See Us?

Many companies today have a corporate mission that focuses on the customer. "To be number one in delivering value to customers" is a typical mission statement. How a company is

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performing from its customers' perspective has become, therefore, a priority for top management. The balanced scorecard demands that managers translate their general mission statement on customer service into specific measures that reflect the factors that really matter to customers.

Customers' concerns tend to fall into four categories: time, quality, performance and service, and cost. Lead time measures the time required for the company to meet its customers' needs. For existing products, lead time can be measured from the time the company receives an order to the time it actually delivers the product or service to the customer. For new products, lead time represents the time to market, or how long it takes to bring a new product from the product definition stage to the start of shipments. Quality measures the defect level of incoming products as perceived and measured by the customer. Quality could also measure on-time delivery—the accuracy of the organization's delivery forecasts. The combination of performance and service measures how the company's products or services contribute to creating value for its customers.


To put the balanced scorecard to work, companies should articulate goals for time, quality,

and performance and service and then translate these goals into specific measures. Senior managers at ECI, for example, established general goals for customer performance: Get standard products to market sooner, improve customers' time to market, become customers' supplier of choice through partnerships with them, and develop innovative products tailored to customer needs. The managers translated these general goals into four specific goals and identified an appropriate measure for each. (See the exhibit "ECI's Balanced Business Scorecard.")

To track the specific goal of providing a continuous stream of attractive solutions, ECI measured the percentage of sales from new products and the percentage of sales from proprietary products. That information was available internally, but certain other measures forced the company to get data from outside. To assess whether the company was achieving its goal of providing reliable, responsive supply, ECI turned to its customers. When it found that each customer defined "reliable, responsive supply" differently, ECI created a database of the factors as defined by each of its major customers. The shift to external measures of performance with customers led ECI to redefine "on time" so it matched customers' expectations. Some customers defined "on time" as any shipment that arrived within five days of scheduled delivery; others used a nine-day window. ECI itself had been using a seven-day window, which meant that it wasn't satisfying some of its customers and overachieving for others. ECI also asked its top ten customers to rank the company as a supplier overall.

Depending on customers' evaluations to define some of a company's performance measures forces that company to view its performance through customers' eyes. Some companies hire third parties to perform anonymous customer surveys, resulting in a customer-driven report card. The J.D. Power quality survey, for example, has become the standard of performance for the automobile industry, while the U.S. Department of Transportation's measurement of on-time arrivals and lost baggage provides external standards for airlines. Benchmarking procedures are yet another technique companies use to compare their performance against competitors' best practices. Many companies have introduced "best of breed" comparison programs: The company looks to one in-

The Balanced Scorecard Links Performance Measures



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dustry to find, say, the best distribution system, to another industry for the lowest cost payroll process, and then forms a composite of those best practices to set objectives for its own performance.

In addition to measures of time, quality, and performance and service, companies must remain sensitive to the cost of their products. But customers see price as only one component of the cost they incur when dealing with their suppliers. Other supplier-driven costs range from ordering, scheduling delivery, and paying for the materials; to receiving, inspecting, handling, and storing the materials; to the scrapping, reworking, and obsolescence caused by the materials; and schedule disruptions (expediting and value of lost output) from incorrect deliveries. An excellent supplier may charge a higher unit price for products than

other vendors but nonetheless be a lower cost supplier because it can deliver defect-free products in exactly the right quantities at exactly the right time directly to the production process and can minimize, through electronic data interchange, the administrative hassles of ordering, invoicing, and paying for materials.

Internal Business Perspective: What Must We Excel At?

Customer-based measures are important, but they must be translated into measures of what the company must do internally to meet its customers' expectations. After all, excellent customer performance derives from processes, decisions, and actions occurring throughout an organization. Managers need to focus on those critical internal operations that enable them to satisfy customer needs. The second part of the balanced scorecard gives managers that internal perspective.

The internal measures for the balanced scorecard should stem from the business processes that have the greatest impact on customer satisfaction—factors that affect cycle time, quality, employee skills, and productivity, for example. Companies should also attempt to identify and measure their company's core competencies, the critical technologies needed to ensure continued market leadership. Companies should decide what processes and competencies they must excel at and specify measures for each.

Managers at ECI determined that submicron technology capability was critical to its market position. They also decided that they had to focus on manufacturing excellence, design productivity, and new product introduction. The company developed operational measures for each of these four internal business goals.

To achieve goals on cycle time, quality, productivity, and cost, managers must devise measures that are influenced by employees' actions. Since much of the action takes place at the department and workstation levels, managers need to decompose overall cycle time, quality, product, and cost measures to local levels. That way, the measures link top management's judgment about key internal processes and competencies to the actions taken by individuals that affect overall corporate objectives. This linkage ensures that employees at lower levels in the organization have clear targets for

ECI's Balanced Business Scorecard

Financial Perspective		Customer Perspective	
GOALS	MEASURES	GOALS	MEASURES
Survive	Cash flow	New products	Percentage of sales from new products
Succeed	Quarterly sales growth and operating income by division		Percentage of sales from proprietary products
Prosper	Increased market share and ROE	Responsive supply	On-time delivery (defined by customer)
		Preferred suppliers	Share of key accounts' purchases
			Ranking by key accounts
		Customer partnerships	Number of cooperative engineering efforts

Internal Business Perspective		Innovation and Learning Perspective	
GOALS	MEASURES	GOALS	MEASURES
Technology capability	Manufacturing geometry versus competition	Technology leadership	Time to develop next generation
Manufacturing excellence	Cycle time, unit cost, yield	Manufacturing learning	Process time to maturity
Design productivity	Silicon efficiency, engineering efficiency	Product focus	Percentage of products that equal 80% of sales
New product introduction	Actual introduction schedule versus plan	Time to market	New product introduction versus competition

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actions, decisions, and improvement activities that will contribute to the company's overall mission.

Information systems play an invaluable role in helping managers disaggregate the summary measures. When an unexpected signal appears on the balanced scorecard, executives can query their information system to find the source of the trouble. If the aggregate measure for on-time delivery is poor, for example, executives with a good information system can quickly look behind the aggregate measure until they can identify late deliveries, day by day, by a particular plant to an individual customer.

If the information system is unresponsive, however, it can be the Achilles' heel of performance measurement. Managers at ECI are currently limited by the absence of such an operational information system. Their greatest concern is that the scorecard information is not timely; reports are generally a week behind the company's routine management meetings, and the measures have yet to be linked to measures for managers and employees at lower levels of the organization. The company is in the process of developing a more responsive information system to eliminate this constraint.

Innovation and Learning Perspective: Can We Continue to Improve and Create Value?

The customer-based and internal business pro-

cess measures on the balanced scorecard identify the parameters that the company considers most important for competitive success. But the targets for success keep changing. Intense global competition requires that companies make continual improvements to their existing products and processes and have the ability to introduce entirely new products with expanded capabilities.

A company's ability to innovate, improve, and learn ties directly to the company's value. That is, only through the ability to launch new products, create more value for customers, and improve operating efficiencies continually can a company penetrate new markets and increase revenues and margins—in short, grow and thereby increase shareholder value.

ECI's innovation measures focus on the company's ability to develop and introduce standard products rapidly, products that the company expects will form the bulk of its future sales. Its manufacturing improvement measure focuses on new products; the goal is to achieve stability in the manufacturing of new products rather than to improve manufacturing of existing products. Like many other companies, ECI uses the percentage of sales from new products as one of its innovation and improvement measures. If sales from new products are trending downward, managers can explore whether problems have arisen in new product design or new product introduction.

In addition to measures on product and process innovation, some companies overlay specific improvement goals for their existing processes. For example, Analog Devices, a Massachusetts-based manufacturer of specialized semiconductors, expects managers to improve their customer and internal business process performance continuously. The company estimates specific rates of improvement for on-time delivery, cycle time, defect rate, and yield.

Other companies, like Milliken & Company, require that managers make improvements within a specific time period. Milliken did not want its "associates" (Milliken's word for employees) to rest on their laurels after winning the Baldrige Award. Chairman and CEO Roger Milliken asked each plant to implement a "ten four" improvement program: Measures of process defects, missed deliveries, and scrap were to be reduced by a factor of ten over the next four years. These targets emphasize the role

Other Measures for the Customer's Perspective

- A computer manufacturer wanted to be the competitive leader in customer satisfaction, so it measured competitive rankings. The company got the rankings through an outside organization hired to talk directly with customers. The company also wanted to do a better job of solving customers' problems by creating more partnerships with other suppliers. It measured the percentage of revenue from third-party relationships.
- The customers of a producer of very expensive medical equipment demanded high reliability. The company developed two customer-based metrics for its operations: equipment up-time percentage and mean-time response to a service call.
- A semiconductor manufacturer asked each major customer to rank the company against comparable suppliers on efforts to improve quality, delivery time, and price performance. When the chip maker discovered it ranked in the middle, managers made improvements that moved the company to the top of customers' rankings.

for continuous improvement in customer satisfaction and internal business processes.

Financial Perspective: How Do We Look to Shareholders?

Financial performance measures indicate whether the company's strategy, implementation, and execution are contributing to bottom-line improvement. Typical financial goals have to do with profitability, growth, and shareholder value. ECI stated its financial goals simply: to survive, to succeed, and to prosper. Survival was measured by cash flow, success by quarterly sales growth and operating income by division, and prosperity by increased market share by segment and return on equity.

But given today's business environment, should senior managers even look at the business from a financial perspective? Should they pay attention to short-term financial measures like quarterly sales and operating income? Many have criticized financial measures because of their well-documented inadequacies, their backward-looking focus, and their inability to reflect contemporary value-creating actions. Shareholder value analysis (SVA), which forecasts future cash flows and discounts them back to a rough estimate of current value, is an attempt to make financial analysis more for-

ward-looking. But SVA still is based on cash flow rather than on the activities and processes that drive cash flow.

Some critics go much further in their indictment of financial measures. They argue that the terms of competition have changed and that traditional financial measures do not improve customer satisfaction, quality, cycle time, and employee motivation. In their view, financial performance is the result of operational actions, and financial success should be the logical consequence of doing the fundamentals well. In other words, companies should stop navigating by financial measures. By making fundamental improvements in their operations, the financial numbers will take care of themselves, the argument goes.

Assertions that financial measures are unnecessary are incorrect for at least two reasons. A well-designed financial-control system can actually enhance rather than inhibit an organization's total quality management program. (See the sidebar "How One Company Used a Daily Financial Report to Improve Quality.") More important, however, the alleged linkage between improved operating performance and financial success is actually quite tenuous and uncertain. Let us demonstrate rather than argue this point.

During the three-year period between 1987 and 1990, a NYSE electronics company made an order-of-magnitude improvement in quality and an on-time delivery performance. The outgoing defect rate dropped from 500 parts per million to 50, on-time delivery improved from 70% to 96%, and yield jumped from 26% to 51%. Did these breakthrough improvements in quality, productivity, and customer service provide substantial benefits to the company? Unfortunately not. During the same three-year period, the company's financial results showed little improvement, and its stock price plummeted to one-third of its July 1987 value. The considerable improvements in manufacturing capabilities had not been translated into increased profitability. Slow releases of new products and a failure to expand marketing to new and perhaps more demanding customers prevented the company from realizing the benefits of its manufacturing achievements. The operational achievements were real, but the company had failed to capitalize on them.

The disparity between improved operational performance and disappointing finan-

Other Measures for the Internal Business Perspective

- One company recognized that the success of its total quality management (TQM) program depended on all its employees internalizing and acting on the program's messages. The company performed a monthly survey of 600 randomly selected employees to determine if they were aware of TQM, had changed their behavior because of it, believed the outcome was favorable, or had become missionaries to others.
- Hewlett-Packard uses breakeven time (BET) to measure the effectiveness of its product development cycle. BET measures the time required for all the accumulated expenses in the product and process development cycle (including equipment acquisition) to be recovered by the product's contribution margin (the selling price less manufacturing, delivery, and selling expenses).
- A major office products manufacturer, wanting to respond rapidly to changes in the marketplace, set out to reduce cycle time by 50%. Lower levels of the organization aimed to radically cut the times required to process customer orders, order and receive materials from suppliers, move materials and products between plants, make and assemble products, and deliver products to customers.

cial measures creates frustration for senior executives. This frustration is often vented at nameless Wall Street analysts who allegedly cannot see past quarterly blips in financial performance to the underlying long-term values these executives sincerely believe they are creating in their organizations. But the hard truth is that if improved performance fails to be reflected in the bottom line, executives should reexamine the basic assumptions of their strategy and mission. Not all long-term strategies are profitable strategies.

Measures of customer satisfaction, internal business performance, and innovation and improvement are derived from the company's particular view of the world and its perspective on key success factors. But that view is not necessarily correct. Even an excellent set of balanced scorecard measures does not guarantee a winning strategy. The balanced scorecard can only translate a company's strategy into specific measurable objectives. A failure to convert improved operational performance, as measured in the scorecard, into improved financial performance should send executives back to their

drawing boards to rethink the company's strategy or its implementation plans.

As one example, disappointing financial measures sometimes occur because companies don't follow up their operational improvements with another round of actions. Quality and cycle-time improvements can create excess capacity. Managers should be prepared to either put the excess capacity to work or else get rid of it. The excess capacity must be either used by boosting revenues or eliminated by reducing expenses if operational improvements are to be brought down to the bottom line.

As companies improve their quality and response time, they eliminate the need to build, inspect, and rework out-of-conformance products or to reschedule and expedite delayed orders. Eliminating these tasks means that some of the people who perform them are no longer needed. Companies are understandably reluctant to lay off employees, especially since the employees may have been the source of the ideas that produced the higher quality and reduced cycle time. Layoffs are a poor reward for past improvement and can damage the morale

How One Company Used a Daily Financial Report to Improve Quality

In the 1980s, a chemicals company became committed to a total quality management program and began to make extensive measurements—of employee participation, statistical process control, and key quality indicators. Using computerized control and remote data entry systems, the plant monitored more than 30,000 observations of its production processes every four hours. The department managers and operating personnel who now had access to massive amounts of real-time operational data found their monthly financial reports to be irrelevant.

But one enterprising department manager saw things differently. He created a daily income statement. Each day, he estimated the value of the output from the production process using market prices and subtracted the expenses of raw materials, energy, and capital consumed in the production process. To approximate the cost of producing out-of-conformance product, he cut the revenues from off-spec output by 50% to 100%.

The daily financial report gave operators powerful feedback and motivation and

guided their quality and productivity efforts. The department head understood that it is not always possible to improve quality, reduce energy consumption, and increase throughput simultaneously; trade-offs are usually necessary. He wanted the daily financial statement to guide those trade-offs. The difference between the input consumed and the output produced indicated the success or failure of the employees' efforts on the previous day. The operators were empowered to make decisions that might improve quality, increase productivity, and reduce consumption of energy and materials.

That feedback and empowerment had visible results. When, for example, a hydrogen compressor failed, a supervisor on the mid-night shift sent an emergency repair crew into action. Previously, such a failure of a noncritical component would have been reported in the shift log, where the department manager arriving for work the following morning would have to discover it. The mid-night shift supervisor knew the cost of losing the hydrogen gas and made the decision that

the cost of expediting the repairs would be repaid several times over by the output produced by having the compressor back on line before morning.

The department proceeded to set quality and output records. Over time, the department manager became concerned that employees would lose interest in continually improving operations. He tightened the parameters for in-spec production and reset the prices to reflect a 25% premium for output containing only negligible fractions of impurities. The operators continued to improve the production process.

The success of the daily financial report hinged on the manager's ability to establish a financial penalty for what had previously been an intangible variable: the quality of output. With this innovation, it was easy to see where process improvements and capital investments could generate the highest returns.

Source: "Texas Eastman Company," Robert S. Kaplan, Harvard Business School case number 9-190-039.

As companies have applied the balanced scorecard, we have begun to recognize that the scorecard represents a fundamental change in the underlying assumptions about performance measurement.

of remaining workers, curtailing further improvement. But companies will not realize all the financial benefits of their improvements until their employees and facilities are working to capacity—or the companies confront the pain of downsizing to eliminate the expenses of the newly created excess capacity.

If executives fully understood the consequences of their quality and cycle-time improvement programs, they might be more aggressive about using the newly created capacity. To capitalize on this self-created new capacity, however, companies must expand sales to existing customers, market existing products to entirely new customers (who are now accessible because of the improved quality and delivery performance), and increase the flow of new products to the market. These actions can generate added revenues with only modest increases in operating expenses. If marketing and sales and R&D do not generate the increased volume, the operating improvements will stand as excess capacity, redundancy, and untapped capabilities. Periodic financial statements remind executives that improved quality, response time, productivity, or new products benefit the company only when they are translated into improved sales and market share, reduced operating expenses, or higher asset turnover.

Ideally, companies should specify how improvements in quality, cycle time, quoted lead times, delivery, and new product introduction will lead to higher market share, operating margins, and asset turnover or to reduced operating expenses. The challenge is to learn how to make such explicit linkage between operations and finance. Exploring the complex dynamics will probably require simulation and cost modeling.

Measures That Move Companies Forward

As companies have applied the balanced scorecard, we have begun to recognize that the scorecard represents a fundamental change in the underlying assumptions about performance measurement. As the controllers and finance vice presidents involved in the research project took the concept back to their organizations, the project participants found that they were not able to implement the balanced scorecard without the involvement of the senior

managers who had the most complete picture of the company's vision and priorities. This was revealing, because most existing performance measurement systems have been designed and overseen by financial experts. Rarely do controllers need to have senior managers so heavily involved.

Probably because traditional measurement systems have sprung from the finance function, the systems have a control bias. That is, traditional performance measurement systems specify the particular actions they want employees to take and then measure to see whether the employees have in fact taken those actions. In that way, the systems try to control behavior. Such measurement systems fit with the engineering mentality of the industrial age.

The balanced scorecard, on the other hand, is well suited to the kind of organization many companies are trying to become. The scorecard puts strategy and vision, not control, at the center. It establishes goals but assumes that people will adopt whatever behaviors and take whatever actions are necessary to arrive at those goals. The measures are designed to pull people toward the overall vision. Senior managers may know what the end result should be, but they cannot tell employees exactly how to achieve that result, if only because the conditions in which employees operate are constantly changing.

This new approach to performance measurement is consistent with the initiatives under way in many companies: cross-functional integration, customer-supplier partnerships, global scale, continuous improvement, and team rather than individual accountability. By combining the financial, customer, internal process and innovation, and organizational learning perspectives, the balanced scorecard helps managers understand, at least implicitly, many interrelationships. This understanding can help managers transcend traditional notions about functional barriers and ultimately lead to improved decision making and problem solving. The balanced scorecard keeps companies looking—and moving—forward instead of backward.

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